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

BUCKLEY: THE PUBLICIST OF THE RIGHT

In the fall of 1965, a candidate for mayor of New York suddenly loomed large on the political scene, making what seemed to be entirely new points in that political arena and making them effectively. He sharply criticised the city's welfare program, he advocated the phased ending of rent control, he attacked the federal government's urban renewal program, and he called the liberal Republican candidate an "imposter." He also claimed that although he was running on the Conservative party ticket, only he was "espousing essentially Republican principles." He handled himself well in interviews, he rephrased loaded questions until they were innocuous, and he made jokes. Many people found this approach extremely refreshing.

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Yet there were also discordant notes in this campaign. How would he solve the city traffic problem? By imposing a heavy tax on all out-of-town vehicles. How would he make our streets safer? By making welfare a means of moving "disturbing" elements to out-of-town welfare centers, where their relief, medical care, and schooling would be dependent on their taking certain unspecified training to rehabilitate them. Why should people support him? Because he views them as adults, and, according to a statement that he made on the Merv Griffin television show of October 25, this means that "people are capable of making sacrifices for the community interest."

I speak, of course, of William F. Buckley, Jr. Today, his five books, his widely publicized interviews and debates with leading liberals, and the magazine National Review which he founded ten years ago and has edited ever since--all have enabled his campaign literature to call him "the nation's foremost spokesman for responsible conservatism." Today, he is honored by a nationwide youth organization, Young Americans for Freedom, which he helped bring into being. Today, his campaign for mayor of New York has given him national publicity. And today, he seems to be making a strong bid to lead the Republican party to his conservatism.

Is his political emergence something the advocates of capitalism should be thankful for, or is he merely using some of the same arguments without having the same principles in mind? It is time to ask, what is the conservatism championed by William F. Buckley, Jr.? To learn this is no easy assignment. He is not a philosopher; he is a commentator. He tracks down anyone he considers a liberal spokesman and comments on his contradictions. He is the master of the sarcastic crack, but this leads him sometimes to neglect refuting arguments for the pleasure of attacking the people who argue. If one examines his books, it's easy to find out many things he's against. But what is he for?

He has termed himself a "radical conservative"--that is, "someone whose ideas are rooted in unchanging principles, but whose respect is great for organic growth and the body of settled opinion."[1] Just what might these "unchanging principles" be? One gets a notion from a speech he gave on the fifth anniversary of the founding of National Review, when he said that the magazine is "organically American, rooted in the nation's deepest traditions, and beyond that even, in the deepest traditions of Western civilization."[2] These traditions are such "certitudes and intuitions" as "that there is a religious base in life, and therefore a transhistorical meaning to the human experience."[2]

Here then are two premises of Buckley's thinking: It is, as he puts it, "rooted" in both religion and tradition. These are two interrelated themes that crop up again and again in his works.

A typical such thematic outcropping is in his facetious, "I should sooner live in a society governed by the first two thousand names in the Boston telephone directory

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than in a society governed by the two thousand faculty members of Harvard University. Why? "In the deliberations of the two thousand citizens of Boston I think one would discern a respect for the laws of God and for the wisdom of our ancestors..."[3] Or again: "What is important to the Liberal...is that there be choice; whereas to the conservative, what is important is, what choices will man, whose first choice was so catastrophic, go on making?"[4] What was this catastrophic first choice? He can only be referring to Adam's decision to eat of the fruit of the tree of knowledge in the Garden of Eden.

To show beyond doubt that for Buckley not only life in general but specifically politics has its base in religious (specifically Christian) faith, one need only cite his debate with a prominent writer who had declared, "I am frankly all but ignorant of theology." Buckley retorted, "If he wants to learn something about the true nature of the American right wing, I recommend to him the works of Presidents Matthew, Mark, Luke and John."[5]

Let me make it clear that I am not here mounting an attack on religion as a private concern. What I question is its relevance to political discourse. Among Buckley's "unchanging principles" he claims "freedom" and "individualism." How does he show that these are, in fact, important political principles? It is no defense of them to say that they are true because God said so (either through the Gospels or the accumulated "wisdom of the West"). But this is what Buckley does. He does not reason, he asserts. In fact, for him reason has little left to do except recognize already revealed or discovered truths which the community has already accepted. "Conservatism is the tacit acknowledgment that all that is finally important in human experience is behind us; that the crucial explorations have been undertaken, and that it is given to man to know what are the great truths that emerged from them. Whatever is to come cannot outweigh the importance to man of what has gone before."[6]

It may by this time come as no surprise to learn that Buckley does not grant prime importance to reason. Quite the opposite. He gives it away to those whom he apprehends to be the enemy--the liberal left. It is the liberals whom he characterizes as tending "to believe that the human being is perfectible and social progress predictable, and that the instrument for effecting the two is reason."[7] Is is the liberals who think that "all peoples and societies should strive to organize themselves upon a rationalist and scientific" base.[7] To confound these supposed advocates of reason, conservatism states that the important truths are beyond reason in their source though apprehensible by it, or divulged by God, or created somehow in tradition where they are preserved as a "body of settled opinion." That is no defense of freedom. With his non-rational approach, Buckley leaves freedom more exposed, more vulnerable than it was before he appeared on the scene.

But is he in fact primarily a defender of freedom? No. In a very complicated way, he is willing to compromise with dictatorship. Worse, in certain contexts he even advocates tyranny.

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Earlier in this article, Mr. Buckley was quoted as saying that one thing a radical conservative respects is "organic growth." He is here referring to the growth of societies, to the communities of man. How do they grow? Not just in size; they grow in their apprehension and possession of freedom. But the concept of a society as an organism which grows, apart from the individuals that make it up, is basically a collectivistic concept--it is treating a group as something distinct from and greater than the aggregate of its members. For Buckley it is not the case that man the individual has certain rights by his very nature. It depends on what group the individual belongs to. The United States and the West in general have reached a stage where they should have a free economy and their citizens should enjoy certain common freedoms under a civilized constitutional government. Why? We are the inheritors of a "Great Tradition" with roots in the "wisdom of the West" and the Constitution and the founding fathers and the Federalist Papers and religion. In other words, Buckley does not hold that it is the case that Jefferson correctly identified inalienable rights in the Declaration of Independence. He didn't write that document because men have rights; rather, Americans have rights because they are educated enough to be able to read Jefferson's document.

But such a level has not been reached by all men, not even by everyone within the United States. "There are circumstances when the minority can lay claim to preeminent political authority without bringing down upon its head the moral opprobrium of just men. In the South, the white community is entitled to put forward a claim to prevail politically because, for the time being anyway, the leaders of American civilization are white--as one would certainly expect given their preternatural advantages of tradition, training, and economic status."[8]

Buckley is not personally a segregationist, only relatively so. He has been quoted by Dan Wakefield as saying that he would vote for segregated schools if he lived in North Carolina, but does not do so in Stamford, Connecticut.[9] He nowhere makes the claim that whites are racially superior, and during his New York campaign for mayor he invited any racist who was thinking of supporting him to "go back to the fever swamps, because I don't want your vote." And yet, what he has done is state an intellectual position which to one degree or another can be used to support racism and politically enforced segregation--whether he likes it or not. For what does his position amount to but a justification for any group who claims the blessings of being the more "civilized" in order to tyrannize over those whom they adjudge to be not so civilized?

Buckley seems to justify this position by an implicit assumption that freedom is the same as an ordered society which is the same as Christian morality. This is the only way that one can understand a statement such as "Under certain circumstances dictatorship is best. I'm interested in human freedom, and the kind of government that maximizes it."[9] His theory of "organic growth" really requires that some people live under a dictatorship because they haven't grown enough. How does he tell? He

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doesn't say, but one suspects that one of the signs might be that there would be disorganization if the dictatorship were relaxed. Thus, he declares Franco Spain is better than the Spanish Republic. Why? He does not say--he merely asserts he would have more freedom.

One might get a clue, however, from a statement that he makes in the same interview by Dan Wakefield--that he would rather live under a Trujillo than a Castro.[9] Here we begin to see that only one kind of dictator will do for Mr. Buckley. The Trujillo dictatorship was in its own small area as absolute as that of Mr. Castro--there can be no choice between them in political principle or in reason. But in the last analysis Mr. Buckley does not go to his reason to find out who and what maximizes freedom. One now remembers that Mr. Buckley is a Catholic.

As a Catholic, he is very explicit that he has no desire to establish the Catholic church in the United States--the separation of church and state is one of our traditions. Yet what difference is there between the absolute dictatorship of Trujillo and the absolute dictatorship of Castro--except that Trujillo, like General Franco, was a Catholic? Catholic dictators who order society in the name of Christian morality can be said to maximize freedom; atheistic dictators who order society in the name of utilitarian altruism, cannot.

It is only a step from this idea to one which says that a country may, under certain circumstances, have to retreat from freedom in order to maximize it. What does Mr. Buckley's conservatism have to say on this issue?

Buckley views communism as a profoundly efficacious threat to the United States and to all of the West, which he sees as being in danger of encirclement by barbarians. In the context of such a threat, he asks "whether a Western nation can pursue a truly effective pro-Western policy while adhering to conventional libertarian attitudes towards the rights and privileges of dissent." He goes on to indicate an answer. "If the Constitution is not, as presently understood, resilient enought to cope with the contemporary requirements of survival, then the Constitution should be modified."[11]

What is he talking about? He is discussing the question of what rights can communists claim in a free society. One might think this is a question of the application of principle. But not according to Mr. Buckley. He says "It is an empirical question."[10] He does not say what he means by "conventional libertarian attitudes," or just what in the Constitution might require modification. But notice that what is missing from his argument is again principle. What he does say is "One of our problems is our enslavement to abstractions."[10] We should go by tradition, because "all that is finally important in human experience is behind us,"[6] until we wonder if tradition is enough to "cope with the contemporary requirements of survival. If it isn't, we change, that's all. On what basis? In what direction? One can only assume that having abandoned the past as a guide, and with no "abstractions" to guide

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us, we will now be ruled by the seeming demands of the present. In neither case are we required to make any statement of principle which our changes must not violate. The door is open for anyone who wants to establish a conservative dictatorship--and what will Buckley demand from the would-be savior? The invocation of the past, and kind words about established religions.

If this seems harsh, notice the end of this particular article where he calls darkly for the abandonment of libertarian attitudes and for constitutional modifications. He ends it with a quote from Macauley, the nineteenth-century English historian. "A nation may be placed in such a situation that the majority must either impose disabilities or submit to them, and that what would, under ordinary circumstances, be justly condemned as persecution, may fall within the bounds of legitimate self-defense."[10]

Buckley quotes this with agreement, so we may hold him to what he is agreeing with. He is agreeing that persecution is relative. That the only limitations on what the majority can do to the minority are set by international circumstances, which alone determine whether the majority is persecuting the minority or acting "in legitimate self defense." This implies either that the rights of the individual are the gift of the majority, which may revoke them when it seems necessary to the "common good," or that there exists a fundamental contradiction in the nature of human rights: that is, sometimes members of a minority have rights and they are right, and sometimes the exercise of these same rights is wrong.

For those who would like to see the eventual establishment of a laissez-faire economy and a constitutional republic in which the only function of government is the protection of rights, William F. Buckley is no ally. What are the differences between his conservatism and the laissez-faire principles that I would advocate?

First of all, Buckley's conservatism does not recognize the crucial importance of reason, which means that he does not recognize the importance of first establishing the political principle of rights and their corollary, the principle of the free market, and then analyzing specific situations or problems in the light of these principles. Rather than conceiving of man as having the ability to establish a just political system by thinking in principle and persuading others to do likewise, Buckley sees man as a cog in a great system of tradition, who would do well to recognize his unimportance and that nothing he can do can measure up to the glories of the past.

Secondly, Buckley is not a champion of the individual. Where an advocate of laissez-faire capitalism would stress the justice of capitalism in rewarding achievement, Buckley stressed to Merv Griffin that his view of men was that they were capable of sacrifice for the group. Where an advocate of capitalism would say that the function of the police was to protect the rights of the individual from being violated by other individuals, Buckley endorses the charter of Young Americans

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for Freedom which describes the function of the police as "the preservation of internal order."[11] It is order that is the pre-eminent value for conservatism, not rights. "In the field of morality, all the basic truths have been apprehended," he states. "There is a purpose in life. It is known what that purpose is, in part because it has been divulged, in part because man is endowed with a rational mechanism by which he can apprehend it."[12] Notice that this "purpose" is not the individual's--he apprehends it, he doesn't formulate it. It is therefore something that exists outside of himself. What purpose? Whose purpose? There only seem to be two possible answers to this, and neither one stresses or even recognizes the importance of the individual. These answers are either that Mr. Buckley is talking about God's purpose, and views man's activities merely as a groping attempt to carry this purpose out--which means nothing if it doesn't mean philosophic determinism--or that he is talking about the purpose of society as a whole, which the individual must serve. In either case, what is the place of the individual's purposes? Subservient to the more general purpose.

Thirdly, Mr. Buckley is not persuaded of the importance of the totally free market as the basic principle of economics. For all his occasional claims to the contrary, Buckley does not stand for the completely free economy. In his 1965 mayoralty campaign he did not challenge the basis of the welfare state in principle--he merely asked that government controls be more efficient and streamlined. Toward the end of his book, Up From Liberalism, he advocates "placing the political and humanitarian responsibility on the lowest feasible political unit" in solving such economic problems as unemployment. Then these units could compete with one another This means that the only allowable question is, is the usurpation of humanitarian areas by the federal government as efficient as the welfare activities of the state or the city?--not, are humanitarian activities a legitimate function of government on any level?

Does William F. Buckley, Jr., support the laissez-faire principle in economics? No, he does not. Does William F. Buckley, Jr., support the principle that the sole function of government is to protect the rights of the individual, and that any government which violates individual rights is a tyranny? No, he does not. Does William F. Buckley, Jr., believe that philosophically the individual is more important than the group? No, he does not. Does William F. Buckley, Jr., hold that the political system which can best be defended in reason is necessarily therefore the best political system? No, he does not.

Yet he claims to be the spokesman for all those who champion laissez-faire economics, limited government, and individualism.

The record speaks for itself. He isn't.

--David J. Dawson

(Citations: see page 8)

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NOTES

1 William F. Buckley, Jr., Rumbles Left and Right (New York, 1961), p. 155.

2 Ibid., p. 86.

3 Ibid., pp. 134, 135.

4 William F. Buckley, Jr., Up From Liberalism (New York, 1961), p. 173, (paperback).

5 Rumbles, op. cit., p. 84.

6 Up From Liberalism, op. cit., p. 172.

7 Ibid., p. 23.

8 Ibid., p. 146.

9 Dan Wakefield, "William F. Buckley, Jr.: Portrait of a Complainer," Esquire, January, 1961.

10 William F. Buckley, Jr., "When Freedom is Threatened," reprinted from the New Guard, the magazine of Young Americans for Freedom, n.d.

11 William F. Buckley, Jr., "Three Drafts of an Answer to Mr. Hamowy," New Individualist Review (Chicago), 1961.

12 Rumbles, op. cit., p. 139.

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REVIEWS

The Insulated Candidate

What Happened to Goldwater? by Stephen Shadegg. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, New York, 1965.

Mr. Shadegg has given us an excellent book in many respects, perhaps a better one than he intended.

He is well qualified to answer the question his book's title asks. He managed both Goldwater's successful Senate campaigns; he was a special consultant to the Senatorial Campaign Committee in Washington; and, though he did not manage the 1964 Presidential campaign, he did serve as one of the regional managers.

When Goldwater first ran for the Senate in Arizona, there had not been enough Republicans in the state to elect a Republican Senator for a quarter of a century. Shadegg tells us that his initial success was partly due to the Eisenhower boom. Fifty thousand registered Democrats crossed party lines to vote for him. But in Goldwater's second try for that office, the Eisenhower boom was over and the Republicans were losing strength in Congress. That time, eighty thousand registered Democrats voted for him. He did not win either of these elections under false pretenses. His constituents knew what he stood for.

He was always a party man, a good one. "In the years between elections I had watched him deal with the dissidents in his own party; I had seen him unite warring factions. . . . He was admittedly the best fund raiser the Republican party ever had." This is not only Shadegg's opinion, for Republicans of all shades of thought--"from Clifford Case of New Jersey, an avowed liberal, to Carl Curtis of Nebraska, a vocal conservative"--respected his ability enough to "insist" that he become chairman of the Senatorial Campaign Committee. And Goldwater gave his help and support to them all. He even brought in his own campaign manager to help. Party unity mattered to him, and he demonstrated this again in 1960 when he was nominated at the Republican Convention. He not only asked that his name be withdrawn, he "urged the conservatives to give their enthusiastic support to Dick Nixon, warned that a split in the party would be disastrous, scolded those dissidents who out of pique threatened to stay home, and pledged his personal efforts to the election of the Republican nominee."

Before Nixon's political corpse was quite cold, a small group of conservative Republicans got together. Headed by Clifton F. White, their primary purpose was to make Goldwater the Republican candidate in 1964. (Their organization was to grow into the Draft Goldwater movement.) They did not inform him of this. His resistance to that idea was very well known. One of his close associates said, ". . .even after the official announcement was made in January, 1964, Goldwater had difficulty adjust-

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ing himself psychologically to the idea that he was the only man in the Republican party qualified to be President. In 1961 the Senator did not even want to talk about it."

In 1963, before Goldwater had decided whether his next campaign would be for the Senate or the Presidency, he replaced Shadegg as campaign manager. The reason he gave was Shadegg's connection with the locally controversial Salt River Project. Shadegg, whose big weakness throughout the book seems to be an unwillingness to draw conclusions from the facts he presents so well, makes no further comment on the subject of his dismissal. The result is a large question mark in the reader's mind. Was this the first action in a pattern that was to become pronounced before the campaign had gone very far, or was it only the case that Goldwater was still hoping that he would not be drawn into the presidential election?

The new campaign manager was Denison Kitchel, a well-known corporation lawyer and long-time friend of Goldwater--and a man with no practical political experience. Kitchel was not at home with politicians, and failed to conceal it. "'That guy just doesn't like politicians,' one national committeeman remarked after being introduced to Kitchel. 'He didn't want to hear anything I had to say.'" This seemed to be true. Kitchel was used to an unhurried atmosphere in which there was plenty of time to think things out. A political campaign does not offer an unhurried atmosphere. Experienced campaigners seemed to him to be rushing headlong in all directions at once. He much preferred the more intellectual society of men like Ph.D. Charles Wiggamore Kelley, and William Joseph Baroody, Sr., who was later to head what Shadegg calls the "think tank" in the presidential campaign.

Baroody was head of the American Enterprise Institute, a non-profit foundation which "contributes research material to members of Congress." Of his political convictions, Shadegg says this: "Although the institute works primarily for politicians, Baroody will not identify himself as a conservative or a liberal." (Italics mine.) With the exception of Washington attorney Ed McCabe, who held an unnamed administrative post under the Eisenhower Administration, neither he nor anyone in his organization had had much experience with practical politics.

Goldwater had begun to weaken by November, 1963, but with the assassination of President Kennedy, "He ordered the Draft movement to suspend its operations." Perhaps it was almost with relief, despite his horror at what had happened. "Do you think I want to live like that," he once asked Shadegg, "with reporters and Secret Service men and secretaries looking over my shoulder every minute of the day and night?"

But the men who wanted Goldwater to be their standard-bearer in 1964 did not listen. They used every bit of influence they could muster. "If their leader refused to run, if their champion, their symbol of courage, their spokesman, were to appear timid and afraid, unwilling to lead the troops, this would be a desertion, a betrayal

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of the principles and the ideals which Goldwater had advanced. . . . He agreed to run because there was nothing else he could do."

From then on, Goldwater was a changed man. He was no longer interested in advice--at least not from the experienced men from whom he had sought it in the past. Baroody, Kitchel, McCabe, speech-writer Karl Hess and a few others formed a closed circle around him, "protecting" him from his old friends, from the other writers in the "think tank," and from such ardent supporters as Clifton F. White and Peter O'Donnell, both of whom had done excellent jobs of organizing support for the Draft Goldwater movement. Kitchel, with no practical experience of his own, named Dean Burch as his assistant. Burch had some local experience, having worked with Goldwater for several years, but was a newcomer to national campaigning, as was Richard Kleindienst, who was named Field Director. Political pros winced at these appointments. Clifton F. White and his work on the Draft Goldwater Committee were all but passed over--White was given a place as Kleindienst's assistant. For Peter O'Donnell, there was no place at all in the national organization.

Having built a wall of inexperienced men around himself, Goldwater now started disregarding his own political advice. He had always said that primaries were not only of little value in winning the nomination, they could also be fatal. In spite of this, however--and in spite of the advice of Raymond Moley who pointed out that winning wouldn't mean much, but a primary loss could be a "serious defeat"--Goldwater entered the New Hampshire primary.

What happened there was to be typical of most of his campaigning straight through November. Advance planning was inadequate. The men who knew the territory, the voters, and the local politicians were not heeded. The campaign was run by a committee, and Kleindienst seems to have expended almost as much effort trying to keep peace among the members of the committee as the committee expended trying to get Goldwater elected.

New Hampshire was lost to the Lodge write-in campaign--but it was worse than just a defeat. It was here that Goldwater first made his controversial remark about allowing NATO's commander to use tactical nuclear weapons. Reporters said he said "commanders," plural, and he was so quoted. Goldwater says he used the word "commander," singular. The newspapers made quite a thing of their version of his remark, and it wasn't until some months later that U.S.News & World Report and Time mentioned the fact that what Goldwater had actually advocated was already the policy of the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations.

In New Hampshire the Social Security misunderstanding also took root. Goldwater had given an interview in which he expressed his views on Social Security. He pointed out that it was "(1) actuarially unsound; (2) a pseudoinsurance program totally unfunded; (3) a proposal originally intended to do no more than prevent stark privation--it had been sold to the American public as retirement insurance; and (4) an

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actual tax levied against the nation's payrolls but collected and spent outside the government's annual budget." Goldwater said that "steps must be taken to strengthen the program in order to prevent it from collapsing. But the headline said Goldwater wanted to destroy Social Security." The headline writer was fired, but the damage had been done, for within forty-eight hours, Rockefeller workers had distributed thousands of reproductions of the out-of-context headline--it is said that every Social Security recipient in the state received a copy.

Oregon was hardly any better. Author Shadegg was in charge of this primary campaign. He was shocked when Goldwater arrived at the airport, marched past all the men and women who had come out to greet him, and drove straight to his hotel, leaving them to stand there holding their posters. He was even more shocked when, after a speech at the Hilton Hotel ballroom, Goldwater marched off the podium and out of the ballroom, without speaking to any of the people who had come from all over the state to see him. He was to have made one more visit to Oregon, but canceled out, leaving Rockefeller an easy victory.

California was next, and it was important. The Goldwater organization was crude by comparison with the smooth professionals Rockefeller was using. Rockefeller was making full use of the misunderstandings that had come out of the New Hampshire race, repeating the distortions, then attacking them. Burch wanted Goldwater to contradict some of the statements the New York Governor was making, but Kitchel vetoed the idea of challenging any other Republican. It was during the California campaign that the Viet Nam statement was made: Howard K. Smith of ABC-TV asked in a pretaped interview how Goldwater thought we could interdict the supply route from Communist China to South Viet Nam. Goldwater replied: "Well, it is not as easy as it sounds, because these are not trails that are out in the open. There have been several suggestions made; I don't think we would use any of them. But defoliation of the forest by low-yield atomic weapons could well be done. When you remove the foliage, you remove the covering." Despite the bitter lessons in New Hampshire, no one seemed aware of the possibility of misinterpretation, and before the taped broadcast even appeared on TV, the wire services were quoting Goldwater as advocating the use of atomic weapons in Viet Nam. UPI later retracted and apologized, but the damage had been done.

Things tightened up after than, and Dick Kleindienst said that Goldwater acted more like a candidate for political office than he did in any other period from January to November. Evidently it helped, for Goldwater won in California.

In his story of the convention, Shadegg intimates that there was a strong movement afoot to split the party, and he explains why. Rockefeller, Scranton and the others could not hope to win the nomination in 1964. If Goldwater was elected President or even made a good showing, there would be no hope for any of them in 1968, either. But if Goldwater did badly enough, 1968 would be wide open.

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Thus, the "Scranton" letter. It horrified the men in the "think tank." Baroody and Kitchel and Hess couldn't understand it. But to the seasoned campaigners in the lower echelons, "It was no threat to their champion . . . but we could see the ultimate effect on the party."

Of course, there was the ultimate effect on Scranton, too. Goldwater had wanted him as a running mate, feeling that this would help reunite the party. This was now out. Shadegg analyzes the letter as being calculated to affect the choice of leaders in 1968, by "a widening of the divisions within the party and lessening of the chances for a Goldwater victory in 1964." This analysis shows that one man who benefited beyond question was Nelson Rockefeller--who had turned over his campaign staff to Scranton in San Francisco. It would be interesting to know just what the "Scranton" man who actually wrote the letter thought he was doing.

Speaking of Rockefeller, one incident at the convention was very interesting--and very odd. When Rockefeller came to the rostrum to urge the adoption of an amendment to the Platform on "extremism," a loud chorus of boos drowned him out. However ill-planned most of the Goldwater campaign was, the communications setup was almost incredibly efficient, and never more so than at the convention. There were seventeen phone lines from the command trailer to areas inside the convention hall. There were also thirty walkie-talkie sets and a small army of pages. When the first boo was heard, the men in the command trailer immediately began calling their contact men on the convention floor, ordering that the boos be stopped. When the last call had been completed, it became clear that the booing was not coming from the Goldwater people at all. "Rockefeller made capital out of the demonstration," says Shadegg. "To some of us, it seemed that he was enjoying the interruption."

After the "Scranton" letter, Goldwater gave up his ineffectual attempts to unite the party. In his acceptance speech, he underscored the dissension in the party where once he might have sought to heal the breach. The part of the speech dealing with extremism, Shadegg says, might have been cheered by all in another context, but in this particular context it "ripped open old wounds and erected barriers which were never broken."

Dean Burch was chosen to head the Republican National Committee. He was unknown in national politics. It was argued that Ray Bliss would have been a much more practical choice, for he was known, liked, and respected by all wings of the party, and by the press and the public as well. Goldwater, who had always been aware of the importance of such things before, turned Bliss down and insisted on Burch. A strange choice--but there were to be stranger things than that before November 4.

The press had done Goldwater a great deal of damage. The columnists in particular had been only too happy to misquote and distort his views, and it has been pointed out that if Goldwater had had a Bobby Baker scandal in his back yard--or indeed any of a dozen or more other blots like those that checkered Lyndon Johnson's career--the

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public would never have heard the end of it. But Goldwater wasn't very considerate of the press at times, either. When Gladwin Hill of The New York Times asked him for an interview, Goldwater suggested he come to Phoenix for the weekend. He did so--only to be turned away at the gate. A nineteen-year-old cub reporter found wandering in the grounds that same day was granted an interview.

There were a good many strange things in the Goldwater campaign, not the least of which was the way Senator Goldwater left audiences in a state of puzzled disappointment. They'd come to hear his views on the things that interested them most, and those would be the things he never mentioned at all. He talked urban problems in agricultural centers, agricultural problems in urban centers, and so on, throughout the campaign. People have thought this was bad planning, but Shadegg tells us it was policy. Kitchel and Baroody had certain views of what constituted honesty in politics, and "had decreed that Goldwater would not lower himself by making a direct appeal for votes with speeches focused on local problems or local interest." The pros on the next rung down from the famous "think tank" were horrified and did all they could to convince Kitchel that this policy was wrong. But it did no good. For that matter, most of the writers in the "think tank" itself were pretty thoroughly insulated from Goldwater, and they rarely if ever had the opportunity to discuss anything with him. Speeches were written, often in committee, then filtered through Kitchel and Baroody, with last-minute changes occasionally made by Goldwater.

The Ronald Reagan speech was one of the strongest and certainly the most popular in the campaign. Ever since it was first aired, people have been asking why there weren't more like that. There was a reason. Though the money to produce it was raised independently, Kitchel and Baroody were strongly opposed to its appearing on the air, and persuaded Goldwater to ask Reagan to cancel it. He did so. Reagan asked Goldwater if he had read the script--he hadn't. Reagan then asked him to do so, and promised that if Goldwater still objected after reading it, all he would have to do was call Reagan, and the broadcast would be canceled. Goldwater did not get in touch with him again.

It is interesting to note the reason Kitchel and Baroody tried to block the broadcast: ". . . it discussed the inadequacies of the present Social Security program and linked Goldwater once again to the sponsorship of some 'voluntary features which would permit a citizen to do better on his own.'" In other words, since Goldwater had been misinterpreted and thus strongly criticized on the Social Security issue, the best thing to do was to shove the whole issue under the rug and forget it as quickly as possible. On just this one issue, it would be interesting to know how many votes Goldwater lost as a result of their policy.

Toward the end of the book, Shadegg quotes from an in-depth survey of voters' views on most of the issues. The study included voters from all over the country, in all economic ranges. He points out that, over and over again, it was Goldwater whose views coincided most closely with those of the voters, and it was Johnson who was in opposition to them.

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But if it was Goldwater who more truly represented the people, why did they elect Johnson? Shadegg offers several reasons. He admits there were many mistakes made in the campaign (such as the above). Also, the press was unfair. But he winds up the book with this contention: "A Goldwater victory would have required the voters to make an official confession of their past failures to face reality, to deal firmly with such matters as deficit financing, nonproductive foreign aid, and an ambivalent foreign policy and selfish self-indulgence.

"And in the year of Goldwater's defeat the people were in a mood to escape responsibility, not accept it."

Is that really what was wrong? Is it even fair? If the survey from which Shadegg quoted had any value, it showed that the voters were facing reality, all right. What they weren't accepting--because neither the candidate himself nor any of the men closest to him gave them reason to--was the possibility that Goldwater represented their views and their concerns.

What happened to Goldwater? Shadegg has told us what happened to his campaign, but what happened to the man? What happened to the Barry Goldwater who was skilled in uniting the dissident elements in his party, who was capable of winning a Senate seat by a large margin in a state where the Democrats outnumbered members of his own party two-and-a-half to one? What happened to the all-time champion fund-raiser? What happened to the man all the Republicans, liberals included, wanted on their side because he knew how to win?

Perhaps the real question is not, What happened to Goldwater? but, Who was Goldwater? Before the campaign his image was two-fold: that of a successful, honest, and charming politician, and that of a spokesman for conservative ideals in his books and his newspaper column.

But in this book we see that Goldwater was not primarily concerned with ideas. Shadegg himself was the one who wrote Goldwater's newspaper column for the first two years. There was no secret about it, and many people knew that Goldwater only provided suggestions and topics--and the by-line. L. Brent Bozell of National Review helped with the writing of both The Conscience of a Conservative and Why Not Victory? Russell Kirk is credited by Shadegg with helping Goldwater to articulate his beliefs. No one of these men was in a position to advise Goldwater on the speeches he made during the campaign--and the image he presented changed, radically.

As has been mentioned before, Shadegg's greatest weakness is his unwillingness to draw conclusions, especially those conclusions which might reflect badly on Goldwater--to whom he has dedicated this book. But it seems to this reader an inescapable conclusion that part of the Goldwater image before the campaign was really Shadegg and Bozell--and that this part was replaced by Kitchel and Baroody during the campaign. Shadegg does not have much to say in favor of Kitchel and Baroody, but

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they are of secondary importance. Whatever damage they did, they were in a position to do it only because Goldwater had chosen them to run his campaign. If it is the case that Goldwater felt dependent on others for his intellectual positions, this would explain why, throughout this book he appears to have put himself so completely in the hands of his advisors that he seemed to be, not a man running for President, but a man being run.

One point that keeps ringing throughout the book like a Greek chorus is the fact that Goldwater did not want to run. He didn't think he could win. He didn't think he could put his policies into effect, could really make a dent in the bureaucratic juggernaut, even if he did win. He ran, in the end, only because his admirers talked him into laying himself on the altar of his convictions. He became an unwilling sacrifice--and like many another before him, he not only cut his own throat, he cut the throats of everyone around him.

Perhaps he was not sure he could control a Presidential campaign--perhaps he was not sure he wanted to. If Shadegg knows, he's not letting the reader in on it, but his account of the resulting debacle is hard to put down. Certainly, one could not ask for a more eloquent demonstration of the fact that it is not enough to know politics in your heart. The voters didn't think so either.

--Avis Brick

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